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The budget is always a big political occasion. However, this year is 
bigger than most. Set by a Chancellor with serious political ambitions, 
it gives an early glimpse at the UK government’s post-Covid economic 
plans. 
The budget needs to tread a fine line, delivering sufficient stimulus 
during the pandemic and immediately afterwards to keep the 
economy afloat, whilst simultaneously convincing Conservative 
backbenchers that this doesn’t threaten their small-state vision. 
The economics are fairly simple and relatively uncontroversial: there 
is no case for significant budget tightening until the economy has 
recovered sufficiently for interest rates to move away from the zero 
lower bound. The politics is not: many within the Conservative Party 
have a quasi-religious belief in the merits of balanced budgets and a 
small state. Of course, the pill of increased state spending (and, 
eventually, higher taxes) can be sweetened by pledges of 
constituency-specific spending for Conservative MPs, of which we see 
plenty. 
A substantial portion of the core document is devoted to outlining the 
measures undertaken during the pandemic, with much of the 
remainder dedicated to outlining how the Chancellor intends to reduce 
the budget deficit later in the parliamentary term. 
Of perhaps more interest is the rather more forward-looking (and 
vague) document that accompanied the budget: “Build Back Better”. 
This appears part of nascent efforts to rebrand the government’s 
Industrial Strategy under the “Build Back Better” label, moving it from 
BEIS to the Treasury. 
Overall, it’s hard not to conclude that the measures announced are 
underwhelming, particularly given the UK’s large productivity deficit 
(both relative to its previous trends and its international peers) and the 
intentions to “level up” poorer regions. All governments want to 
improve productivity growth and it’s difficult to see what transformative 
policies are here. Moreover, as is always the case on budgetary 
matters, it takes a lot to “move the needle”. 
East Germany experienced a complete institutional overhaul and 
sustained vast fiscal transfers over many years in an effort to “level 
up”. The total amounts involved must total hundreds of millions of 
pounds (in current terms). Handouts of a few million pounds here and 
there, alongside token gestures towards devolution just won’t cut it. 
The document points out upcoming capital spending (broadband, 
roads, rail and cities) to the tune of £100bn (up from £70bn in 2019). 
This was originally announced in last year’s Spending Review and is 
welcome, although it remains below what is necessary to catch up 
following the squeeze of recent years. Most important of all, however, 
is ensuring that future capital spending is on the right priorities and in 
the right areas. The recent furore over the allocation of funding for 
deprived towns does not imbue one with confidence. 
The document stresses both the Levelling Up fund and the Shared 
Prosperity Fund. However, we continue to lack detail on what these 
will look like. Moreover, the UK will need to do a significant amount for 
many areas just to make up for lost EU funding (ESIF). To make a big 
difference will unfortunately mean spending much, much more (and 
sensibly). 
The Towns Fund is a modest pot of money overall and, as mentioned, 
there are concerns over the process used to allocate money. 
Moreover, the High Street Fund can only begin to address some of 
the damage of the past year. In any event, much activity that has 
moved online is likely to stay there (with productivity gains thrown into 
the mix). 
The “smart money” will be on helping town centres transform and 
adapt to this new world. We would posit that this is likely to involve a 
much greater focus on “experiences” (cafés, places to eat, escape 
rooms and the like) and less on traditional “high street shopping”. 
Any funding to help achieve net zero is welcome, although the details 
will be key. Also note that £12bn, although it sounds generous, is still 
much less than has been allocated to Test & Trace alone during the 
pandemic, and will be spread over time. The new UK Infrastructure 
Bank looks like it could be promising. Again, the challenge lies in how 
the details work out in practice. 
In terms of skills (an area the UK needs to address, particularly 
outside of London), the proposals look modest. Much of the focus on 
technical training is carried over from Theresa May’s government. 
This is an area where UK governments have been seeking to make 
improvements for many years, with mixed success. Much of the heavy 
lifting of “upskilling” in recent years has actually been undertaken by 
universities, particularly through efforts to widen participation. Policy 
will want to ensure that any changes do not damage this. 
The Lifetime Skills Guarantee is promising, although there are 
probably benefits from increasing lifelong funding for higher skills 
levels too. The focus on improving apprenticeships is very welcome. 
This is an area that has not always lived up to its enormous promise 
but will be key moving forward. 
However, on innovation, the regulatory system and visas for skilled 
workers the proposals are very thin on detail (perhaps deliberately, 
given the sensitivity around post-Brexit regulatory change and 
immigration). Every government talks around supporting innovation: 
what substantial and radical new proposals are actually on offer? One 
area that is welcome is the focus on “scale-up” firms – this represents 
a positive shift from previous work that has focussed only on start-
ups. There is increasing evidence that firms that “scale up” are 
responsible for productivity growth and innovation. 
As already alluded to, much needs fleshing out regarding “levelling 
up”, to which we would add that successful implementation of the 
Freeports programme will need buy-in and cooperation from the 
devolved administrations. This is far from guaranteed. Talk of 
“supporting jobs growth” in green industries needs to be better backed 
up by specifics. The same is true of the section on “Global Britain”. 
In conclusion, all of these ideas have some promise but detailed 
policy proposals and very substantial amounts of money are now 
needed in order to make them real. Otherwise, we shall remain with 
empty slogans. 
 
